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ENCLOSURE C

YUGOSLAVIA

- 1. Soviet Objective. Moscow's goal remains the restoration of its control of Yugoslavia through the elimination of the Tito government and its replacement by a government subservient to the USSR.
- 2. Present Status. Moscow has applied strong economic, political, and psychological pressures short of war in an effort to weaken the Tito regime and isolate it from the Soviet orbit. The USSR and its satellites have established an economic blockade against Yugoslavia, and have inspired and encouraged sabotage and subversive activity against the Tito regime. The Soviet bloc countries have renounced their mutual assistance treaties with Yugoslavia, virtually suspended diplomatic relations, and harrassed and intimidated Yugoslav diplomats abroad. The Yugoslav minorities in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria have suffered intimidation and discrimination. The Yugoslav government has proved capable of resisting these pressures, but the economic crisis resulting from the drought of last summer has increased substantially the difficulties that it faces.

 Nevertheless it continues probable that the Tito regime will survive.
- 3. Possible Courses of Action. The Soviet Union has three possible courses of action: (a) it can maintain its present pressure, (b) it can attempt to stage internal violence linked with foreign guerrilla incursions, or (c) it can resort to open military action, either by the satellites with



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- Seviet logistic support and guidance, or by combined Soviet and satellite courses. Neither (a) or (b) offer under present circumstances prospects of success.
- A. Bolitical Indications of Intent. Soviet-satellite pressures on Yugoslavia have not notably increased during the current crisis. There has been an obvious effort to capitalize propaganda-wise on the drought, particularly through the allegation that the US aid program is designed to buy the Yugoslav army. Also there has been a renewal of the themes Yugoslavia is to be used as a base for starting a new Balkan war, and Bulgaria and Albania have recently increased charges that Yugoslavia has violated air space and that Yugoslavia is responsible for border incidents. There has, however, been nothing to suggest that Moscow is planning an early change in its approach to a solution of the Yugoslav problem.
 - 5. Military Indications of Intent. (To be supplied by G-2).
- 6. Conclusions. Under present conditions the only way in which the Soviet Union can overthrow the Tito government is by the direct military invasion of Yugoslavia. Effective occupation of Yugoslavia in the face of Yugoslav guerrilla resistance and the establishment of a Yugoslav regime subservient to the Kremlin would probably require direct Soviet participation. Fresent indications do not, however, point to a Soviet intention to launch a direct aggression against Yugoslavia in the immediate future.

